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Abstract: In the debate about indigenous cultural property, the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) of the United States has de-
veloped and implemented an unorthodox concept of “cultural affiliation.” The
act entitles Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations to claim repatriation
of their cultural property—comprising human remains, funerary objects, sacred
objects, and objects of cultural patrimony—upon the establishment of a specific
shared group identity and a cultural affiliation to an object. The concept of cul-
tural affiliation in the act replaces proof of ownership, or proof that an object was
stolen or illicitly removed. It thereby amends traditional standards saturated in
notions of property and ownership that have perpetuated since Roman law and
allows the evolution of a control regime over cultural property that takes into
account the cultural aspects of the objects. On an international level, the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) of 2007
stipulates a similar emancipation of indigenous peoples’ cultural property claims
from notions of property and ownership. This article explores NAGPRA’s cultural
affiliation concept as it stands between private property and human rights law
and brings into focus the concept’s elements that go beyond traditional property
law. It ultimately looks at the potential and limits of the concept from an inter-
national perspective as a standard for other countries that consider implementa-
tion of UNDRIP’s provisions on indigenous, tangible, movable cultural property.
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INTRODUCTION
In societies influenced by classical and Justinian Roman law, the legal protection of
proprietas, dominium, or ownership, has developed as the most encompassing right
of humanity over res—the material things of this earth.1 Legal protection of prop-
erty in this way was revolutionary at the time and had not existed previously in old
Roman law, which treated res as integral to the house dominion of the paterfamilias
over persons.At that time, the common use of res for the family, and not a detached
economic perspective, determined the value of things.2 The development of prop-
erty under classical and Justinian law into an absolute right uncoupled from the house
dominion and factual possession reflected a new economic necessity to regulate an
increased exchange of goods and a shift toward a trade-orientated perspective.
In its area of influence, the Roman law principles of private property were estab-
lished in the following centuries as the leading concepts of property law, even though
they were fervently challenged philosophically, sociologically, and legally. The on-
going controversy ranged from John Locke’s view that property is central for life and
liberty3 to Pierre Joseph Proudhon, who considered that property is equal to theft.4
Today, however, private property stands firmly in Western statutory and com-
mon law and celebrates the spreading of its extensive, trade-friendly dimension
throughout the world. The antipodal communist theories of the nineteenth cen-
tury aiming at the limitation of private property have failed in practice. The
expansion of private property is also reaching remote areas and developing
countries driven by highly influential proponents like the Peruvian economist Her-
nando de Soto Polar, who evaluated private property not only as the fundamental
driving force of themarket economy, but also as themost important instrument for
development.5 The philosophical and religious question, “What kind of res should
be accessible for private property,”has dissolved into the question,“What should be
excluded from private property.” The question is specifically relevant for cultural
property.6 Roman law excluded such objects from private property as res extra com-
mercium. How does and should the law treat such property today?
An important feature of cultural property is its cultural function in a commu-
nity. It triggers aspects of collective use and collective holding. In the form of col-
lective property—sometimes also referred to as common property7—it has been
advocated as necessary for improving human lives since Plato.8 Today, however, any
collective property is highly monopolized by modern states. With the exception of
the Antarctic, all the territory of the world is divided between states.9 State forming
went hand in hand with private property expansion and served as legitimizing in-
struments for exploiting land resources in the new worlds to an extent that was un-
known to the native peoples.10 At the same time, the collective property held by
smaller society sections beyond private company law or the law of associations lost
protection and declined.11 Evolutionists identified collective property as a distin-
guishing feature between “civilized” and “primitive” peoples,12 which expanded to
the general labeling of collective property as“primitive.”Emile de Laveleye even called
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it the“Commons”(Allmend) in Switzerland,which are still-existing community par-
cels of land called“primitive property”because of their communal domain.13 Schol-
ars went so far as to call collective property a deformation of natural law.14
It is the constantly growing international indigenous rights movement that brings
the relevancy of collective property for smaller, indigenous structures into focus
again. Indigenous peoples require respect and support for property of collective
structures combined with traditional ways of life and beliefs.
The collective interest of indigenous peoples in their movable, tangible cultural
property—including human remains, funerary, sacred and ceremonial objects, ob-
jects of cultural importance and cultural patrimony, and artefacts15—is the start-
ing point of this article. In 2007, this interest enjoyed important international
recognition, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples16 (UNDRIP), which stipu-
lated the protection of indigenous peoples’ cultural property as an essential
precondition for their collective well-being.However, nearly two decades beforeUN-
DRIP’s adoption, the United States already enacted theNativeAmericanGraves Pro-
tection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) of 16 November 1990.17 It not only paved
the way for UNDRIP’s moveable cultural property provisions, but also allows a look
into more than 20 years’ experience with the implementation of such law. NAG-
PRA leaves the solid ground of private property law by applying a revolutionary new
“cultural affiliation” concept that may serve as a valuable example for other coun-
tries that are willing, or obliged, to strengthen collective property along cultural lines
according to UNDRIP’s provisions on movable, tangible cultural property.
This article will look into the most important property law principles that stand
in an old Roman law tradition and still dominate cultural property regulations.
The necessity to think beyond such property principles is examined, specifically
with regard to indigenous cultural property (in the section on “Cultural Property
and the Necessity to Think Beyond Property Law”). With the discussion of a legal
theory that goes beyond the principles of property law for indigenous cultural
property claims, the article leads to the cultural affiliation concept of NAGPRA
(section on “Cultural Affiliation in NAGPRA”). It will then look from an inter-
national perspective at the cultural affiliation concept as a standard to implement
the relevant UNDRIP provisions in other countries. For this reason, it evaluates
the factors that helped the concept to succeed in the United States, and the limits
that the United States legislator deemed necessary for the concept to be passed
(section on “Cultural Affiliation From an International Perspective”).
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND THE NECESSITY TO THINK
BEYOND PROPERTY LAW
The core of property law is the absolute, legally protected dominion of individuals
over things. It represents the historical and deeply rooted basis of property law.
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From classical Roman law onwards, such dominium, or proprietas, has been an a
priori unrestricted individual right, indefinite in time and providing absolute power
over things.18 It developed as the legal emancipation from the purely factual pos-
session19 and was thus a courageous looking beyond the factual control of a thing
into the means by which a thing was acquired.20 Good title replaced possession as
the defining element of the relationship between persons and things. Further-
more, the act of acquisition became the central element of property law. Under
Roman law acknowledged acts of acquisition were (1) original appropriation, of
which occupatio was the oldest form, and (2) derivative acquisition or transfer
from another person (the auctor). The latter required, in addition to the act of
acquisition, the previous right of the auctor, as nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre
potest quam ipse habet (nobody can transfer more than he has himself).21 On the
basis of these principles, a claimant could file the rei vindicatio, the highly formal-
ized Roman claim of the nonpossessing alleged owner against the possessor. The
goal of the claim was to (1) determine ownership of the claimant and (2) to ob-
tain the thing. Defense against such a claim could be successful if the defendant
could prove a legitimate act of acquisition with regard to the object, either origi-
nal or derivative, including proof of good title of any predecessor.22 If the obtain-
ing of the thing was not possible, Roman law developed as an alternative the
possibility of compensating the owner in money.23 It thereby transformed res into
financial values.
These Roman law principles have highly influenced modern property laws. The
absolute-right character of ownership, the looking into the act of acquisition for
defining legitimate property, and monetary compensation for res are today firm
components of property regimes. However, the burning question is whether these
property principles are the appropriate tools for all disputes about all things. Roman
law answered this question with a clear “no.” Res extra commercium could explic-
itly not be subject to the rei vindicatio claim. The category of res extra commer-
cium included divine (especially sacred and religious) communal or public objects,24
material that we would classify as “cultural property” today.
Today’s civil law regimes try to follow this tradition of the modern cultural prop-
erty rationale. For example, the res extra commercium exemption of cultural ob-
jects from property law directly influenced French jurisdiction when the Cour de
cassation decided in 1896 that some miniatures stolen from a public municipal
library were public property and not subject to the rules of private commerce.25
Italy explicitly defines a public domain for res extra commercium in its Civil Code,
which includes culturally valuable objects such as “immovables” of special impor-
tance and museum collections.26 In Switzerland, the Swiss Federal Act on the In-
ternational Transfer of Cultural Property of 1 June 2005 established the legal
foundation for res extra commercium cultural property, provided that the items
are of specific importance to the cultural heritage and listed in the federal cultural
property register (Article 3). At the cantonal level, several laws additionally ex-
clude listed cultural property from private commerce as res extra commercium.27
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Prima facie, such laws free cultural objects from private property principles. At
the same time, however, they deliver the objects into a regulatory vacuum, which
raises difficult questions. If the vacuum is not otherwise filled, for example, with
clerical rules for sacred objects,28 should the state have free choice to decide upon
such public domain? Is the public domain a static area, or should the objects be
able to enter the realm of property law through commodification again? Civil law
countries resolve the question by bringing cultural property back into a legal prop-
erty protection regime through ex lege ownership clauses on behalf of the state,
combined with principles of inalienability and timeless exemption from prescrip-
tion or bona fides acquisition.29 The international cultural property law, which
was established to better protect the res extra commercium status of cultural prop-
erty, also fails to go beyond property thinking. It requires the establishment of
enforcement instruments together with import and export control mechanisms to
flank state ownership of cultural property30 and gives specific treatment to war-
time plundered31 or stolen objects.32 The focus lies on the absolute property right
of states and specific illegitimate acts of acquisition. Discussions turn on the ques-
tions of who should have absolute property rights over an object and how the
cultural property was acquired. Financial compensation serves as the ultimate “sheet
anchor” for protecting private or state property in cultural objects.
Adequate solutions for cultural property disputes and law, specifically with re-
gard to indigenous cultural property, would require thinking beyond the basic prin-
ciples of property law. The old, codified civil property laws leave little space to do
so. The enactment of cultural property provisions or statutes is necessary. In the
common law tradition of Anglo-American property law, a smoother development
is possible. It allowed cultural property to become the “fourth estate” of property
law, forming its own separate category next to real property, intellectual property
and personal property.33 The step has been viewed critically from several direc-
tions, including those protecting the marketplace of goods, the cultural commons,
or cosmopolitanism on the new category and its regulations.34 However, the idea
of treating cultural property separately proved to be fertile ground for new theo-
ries that clearly go beyond property thinking.
Such an interesting theory has been developed by Carpenter, Katyal, and Ri-
ley.35 The different worldviews of indigenous peoples stimulated these three au-
thors to root their concept in a relational vision of cultural property by emphasizing
(1) human and social values beyond wealth-maximization purposes,36 (2) the flu-
idity and dynamic character of property instead of the mainly stabilizing forces of
property law,37 and (3) the group interest in cultural property other than the one
of nation states.38 The ultimate outcome of the theory is a proposal that steward-
ship becomes the ruling concept for cultural property, amending property law def-
initions of ownership.39 The starting point for the theory is the shift in emphasis
from the absolute right over property, to the view of property as a bundle of rel-
ative entitlements. To define such entitlements with regard to indigenous cultural
property, the authors look at the indigenous peoples’ rights, interests, and obliga-
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tions and come to the conclusion that their language for describing the relation-
ship between persons and objects should focus on obligations of custody, care,
and trusteeship rather than on rights, entitlements, or dominion over things.40 In
comparing the necessity of stewardship duties with the situation of corporate man-
agement and environment protection, the authors suggest that the fiduciary du-
ties of indigenous peoples vis-à-vis their cultural property should be bound up
with the web of interests in their cultural property independent of any ownership
status.41
CULTURAL AFFILIATION IN NAGPRA
The Concept of Cultural Affiliation
The new property approach along cultural lines of indigenous communities, as
set forth in the theory outlined above, has a predecessor in the legal reality of the
United States: the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAG-
PRA) of the United States enacted on 16 November 1990. This law sets up an
unorthodox process to allocate old and newly excavated Native American human
remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony. The
revolutionary key feature of this process is the application of a “cultural affilia-
tion” prong, which is applied independently of property thinking. It gives the no-
tion of culture a new, directly applicable, and enforceable legal value, and downplays
the financial value of the objects.
To establish cultural affiliation, NAGPRA first requires evidence of an ongoing
relationship between a present-day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization
and an identifiable earlier group. The regulations, which further implement NAG-
PRA, specify this relationship by requiring the following:42
1. Existence of an identifiable present-day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization
2. Evidence of the existence of an identifiable earlier group
3. Evidence of shared group identity between the present-day tribe or organi-
zation with the identifiable earlier group
Thereafter, the affiliation of the group or specific members of that group and
the objects has to be evaluated.43 For the final allocation of objects within the
group, lineal descendants of the deceased, in the case of human remains and fu-
nerary objects, and the original holders of objects, in the case of cultural items,
take precedence over tribes and organizations.44 Ultimately, cultural affiliation de-
cides which person or group of persons shall be the owner, possessor, or steward
of an object, resulting in repatriation if necessary.
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The cultural affiliation prong abandons the language of property and works
with a language that emphasizes personal relations and interrelations with regard
to an object. It takes into account that the colonial private property regime was
superimposed on Native American cultural property,45 of which the possession
and use was formerly tied in with complex social and spiritual linkages between
peoples and their surrounding world “through ties that did not have an abstract
existence but were activated within social gatherings and rituals.”46 The idea that
cultural property may be accessible for private property reconceptualized Native
Americans’ relationships to cultural practices within changing social and spiritual
bonds. Through the cultural affiliation component, NAGPRA allows a redevelop-
ment of Native American traditional relations and ties, and loosens the tight pri-
vate property language and thinking.
NAGPRA takes the prevalence of cultural interrelations over property princi-
ples even further, as it amends Western legal criteria of procedural proof for cul-
tural affiliation. It additionally acknowledges “oral tradition,” or “hearsay” as
evidence for cultural affiliation, alongside geographical, kinship, biological, archae-
ological, anthropological, linguistic, folklore, and historical information or expert
opinion.47 It also refrains from requiring actual “proof” or “scientific certainty” of
cultural affiliation, but only looks for a preponderance of evidence.48 This again
goes in line with indigenous views, like their customs and rules, inter alia with
regard to property and cultural objects, mainly based upon oral traditions passed
down from generation to generation.
ForWestern private property minds, the resolving of “ownership” questions based
on hearsay stories about cultural relationship is a challenge. This may be illus-
trated by a NAGPRA case regarding three painted Native American shields.
The Pectol Shields, named after their finder’s family name, were in the posses-
sion of the Capital Reef National Park in south-central Utah, when NAGPRA re-
quired the park to reallocate and possibly repatriate the shields to the Native
Americans. Several archaeological expert opinions, consultations with Native Amer-
ican tribes, and the radiocarbon dating of the shields, left the cultural affiliation of
the shields unresolved. They were unique in the anthropological records, and too
little was known about the various Native American groups in the area during the
period of the shields’ manufacture around 300–400 years previously.49 The Na-
vajo singer or medicine man John Holiday finally provided the necessary “evi-
dence,” by telling the most convincing hearsay story. He related that a Navajo man
called Many Goats White Hair had created the shields nine generations previously
as sacred ceremonial objects. In the 1860s, when the U.S. Army rounded up about
half of the Navajo tribe and drove them to Fort Sumner in New Mexico, two other
Navajo men,Man Called Rope and Little BitterWater Person, were concerned about
the shields’ safety. They hid them in an area which the Navajos call the Mountain
With No Name and Mountain With White Face. This story was the reason why
the shields were ultimately repatriated to the Navajo Nation. John Holiday’s story
was convincing because he could identify Man Called Rope as his grandfather,
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and because Navajos and anthropologists alike considered John Holiday as a highly
respected man of impeccable integrity.50
This story is far from the notion of Western ownership proof and to some ex-
tent “painfully unclear” as an applied rule of evidence. One may also question,
whether the story lead to a legally correct or rather politically motivated deci-
sion.51 Nevertheless, the experience with NAGPRA shows that native oral histories
and traditions have become highly important and carry a lot of weight in the de-
cisions of scientists, museums, and agencies about the treatment and transfer of
Native American cultural property. They became invaluable as a source for test-
able hypotheses even relating to prehistoric times. Steven J. Gunn counted at least
308 cases, in which oral histories and oral traditions played a role in determining
cultural affiliation.52 It is thus an important instrument for making NAGPRA and
its cultural affiliation work.
In practice, the cultural affiliation concept is not the easiest, fastest, or most
unambiguous concept to deal with.53 Yet, since NAGPRA’s enactment in 1990, the
concept has encountered few disputes assessed by the NAGPRA Review Commit-
tee54 and only two major limitations. Both limitations concern specifically the al-
location of human remains. The first one is the question of whether and how the
cultural affiliation prong applies in defining an object as “Native American” in the
sense of NAGPRA. In the most significant litigation under NAGPRA about a 9000-
FIGURE 1. Mr. Pectol and daughters Golda and Devona hold the three Buffalo shields.
Photo courtesy of the E.P. and Dorothy Hickman Pectol Family Organization.
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year-old skeleton, called the Kennewick man, district and appellate courts desig-
nated the limits of the cultural affiliation concept. Briefly, they held that the
Kennewick man’s bones had “no special and significant genetic or cultural rela-
tionship to [a] presently existing indigenous tribe, people, or culture” and were
thus not subject to the protection of NAGPRA.55 In addition, they held that oral
traditions could not bridge the period between the time when the Kennewick man
lived and the present day.56 However, the courts left it for practice to define from
what time period very old objects qualify as Native American.57 The second big
issue on cultural affiliation was resolved by an amendment to the NAGPRA Reg-
ulations, adopted in March 2010. Federal agencies and museums did not know
how to proceed with human remains and associated funerary objects previously
determined to be Native American, but for which no lineal descendant or cultur-
ally affiliated Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization could be identified.
The amendment to the regulations on culturally unidentifiable human remains
now determines that it shall be left to the Native American tribes to identify the
culturally affiliated tribe where the human remains shall be possibly repatriated.58
Scholars expect that the regulations will lead to a tectonic shift in the balance of
power between museums and indigenous groups, and that museums are likely to
challenge the regulations in court as exceeding the scope of allowable administra-
tive action under NAGPRA.59
In the United States, both limitations of the cultural affiliation concept have
been widely discussed. Instead of analyzing the national discussions once more,
this article will take the concept of cultural affiliation forward and bring it into a
broader legal and international context for evaluating the basic factors that ought
to be considered if the concept of cultural affiliation is to serve as a national stan-
dard in other countries.
NAGPRA and Property Law
When looking at NAGPRA’s cultural affiliation concept, one must be aware that it
forms part of a property act that is principally rooted in property thinking. To
gain a broader picture of how the cultural affiliation concept is embedded in the
act, one has to recall that the act regulates two major issues. It first resolves the
question of how federal agencies and museums should treat Native American cul-
tural property kept in their collections. NAGPRA answers this question by oblig-
ing federal agencies and museums to inventory Native American human remains,
summarize cultural items and thereafter—if possible, requested, and not legally
prevented—repatriate them to culturally affiliated Native Americans or Native Ha-
waiian organizations.60 The second central section in NAGPRA regulates the al-
location of Native American archaeological items newly excavated or discovered
on federal or tribal lands after NAGPRA’s enactment (16 November 1990). NAG-
PRA makes clear that ownership or control of such items should be allocated to
the Native Americans or Native Hawaiian organizations.61
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The first section on repatriation is based on a general assumption on behalf of
the Native Americans. At the very beginning stands the assumption that transac-
tions with Native American cultural property were generally deficient and that
culturally affiliated persons or groups remained the rightful owners of Native Amer-
ican objects, despite any transfer and until proven otherwise. This is one of the
consequences that NAGPRA took from the insight that in the past a significant
amount of Native American cultural property “was acquired through illegitimate
means.”62 It reflects a study on Native American cultural property mandated by
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978,63 which concluded regard-
ing Native American cultural property: “Most sacred objects were stolen from their
original owners. In other cases, religious property was converted and sold by Na-
tive people who did not have ownership or title to the sacred object.”64
In order to rebalance this assumption, NAGPRA contains a possibility for a party
that is not willing to repatriate an object, to prove a “right of possession” of the
object.65 This leans toward ownership, but is not. NAGPRA defines the right of
possession as “the possession obtained with the voluntary consent of an individ-
ual or group that had authority of alienation.”66 NAGPRA considers the act of
acquisition and thus one of the basic property law principles in order to allocate
an object. However, the view of this act of acquisition is an exceptional one, as it
first asks about the alienability of an object in the application of Native American
customs before it looks at the transaction itself. It thereby allows the Native Amer-
icans to qualify an object as res extra commercium before the acquisition of good
title by transfer may be considered.
Another element in NAGPRA’s repatriation section seems to turn a conflict about
Native American property into a more or less conventional property dispute. It is
the possibility that Native Americans may file a repatriation claim for their sacred
objects and objects of cultural patrimony based upon previous“ownership”or“con-
trol.”67 This option forms an alternative to the repatriation claim based upon cul-
tural affiliation.68 It emphasizes the property character of the objects by asking for
ownership. However, it again weakens such claim on absolute property rights by al-
lowing evidence of previous control over an object instead. The use of the nontech-
nical term control opens an unexplored avenue of interpretation and seems to add
factual possession as an alternative to ownership.69 Even this property claim inNAG-
PRA is thus a differentiated property claim if compared to a regular ownership claim.
The NAGPRA section on newly excavated and discovered archaeological items
uses property law terms when defining “the ownership or control” (emphasis added)
of such items.70 Similar to states’ ownership of cultural property found on state
territory, NAGPRA stipulates that the Native Americans shall be the “owners” or
“controllers” of objects found on federal or tribal lands. However, NAGPRA goes
on to fill the ownership term with a list that defines the persons and tribes who
shall receive the objects. It starts with the lineal descendants as the prioritized own-
ers of human remains and associated funerary objects,71 followed by the tribal
landowners for receiving unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and ob-
42 KAROLINA KUPRECHT
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0940739112000057
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 14:33:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
jects of cultural patrimony.72 The last ones in the priority list are the culturally
affiliated tribes, or tribes with aboriginal land occupation, or with any other strong
cultural relationship.73 The property relevance of this ownership system is unique
and difficult to assess within the cultural property system. Despite its property
context, it deviates, as a new allocation system, from basic private property find-
ers’ law principles.
As can be seen from these provisions, NAGPRA mixes the cultural affiliation
concept with traditional property law terms and considerations, thereby embed-
ding the statute to some extent back into a familiar legal system. This helps the
new concept to find acceptance and to work in practice, as the property law terms
may serve as checks and balances for resolving disputed cases. However, NAGPRA
does in no way treat cultural items as financial values and lacks any obligation to
compensate for repatriations or findings through excavation. It thereby abolishes
good faith acquisition mechanisms and finders’ fees.
NAGPRA and Human Rights Law
Even though NAGPRA stands in a property law context, the act is generally qual-
ified as human rights legislation.74 Important driving forces behind its enactment
was the national and international claim for respect of indigenous peoples’ right
of self-determination and the insight that Native Americans need to be included
in terms of humanity.75 For decades Native American human remains were exca-
vated, collected, and researched for scientific reasons. Not least of all they served
to prove Native American’s racial inferiority as “savages.” Such activities were often
tolerated, supported, or even ordered by the government.76 The existing federal
and state law did not come close to protecting Native American graves in the same
way as Western graves.77 The revealing of the highly discriminatory incidents re-
garding Native American human remains together with a mounting Native Amer-
ican skepticism against scientific research on the remains emerged into a nationwide
Indian burial rights movement.78 Around the same time, the federal government
in the United States started serious efforts to redirect the Smithsonian Institution’s
vast holdings of Native American and Hawaiian material. Museum collections of
Native American objects were no longer seen as “representations of reality,” but
rather as “hostages” to imperialist values.79 The outcome was the National Mu-
seum of the American Indian Act of 1989,80 which inter alia contained detailed
repatriation provisions and the establishment of the National Museum of the Amer-
ican Indian in Washington, DC, that opened its doors in 2004.81 The national ac-
tivities coincided with a new international spirit of cooperation on the protection
of cultural heritage. As a consequence, the United States agreed with Latin Amer-
ican states on the protection and repatriation of pre-Columbian heritage and rat-
ified in 1982 the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing
the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 1970.
All of these factors paved the way for NAGPRA’s enactment in 1990.82
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Under legal terms, the treatment of Native American human remains was newly
considered an infringement of the rights of nondiscrimination.83 Under the U.S.
Constitution, the Equal Protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and the First Amendment protecting Free Exercise of Religion served as a
basis to back such human rights infringement claims.84 With regard to human
remains, NAGPRA was thus designed to address the flagrant violations of the “civil
rights of America’s first citizens.”85 The rationale behind the claim for protection
and repatriation of sacred objects and cultural patrimony was rooted in violated
civil rights or human rights connected with land taking, resettlements, reservation
building, genocide, as well as encompassing assimilation programs prohibiting
ceremonies.86
Nevertheless, NAGPRA’s codification of human rights in such an extensive cul-
tural property act is a phenomenon which is singular worldwide.87 It relied on a
broad national consensus to resolve the Native Americans’ claims for respect, proper
treatment, and repatriation of their cultural property by statutory law. Not only
Native American tribes and organizations but also numerous major associations
of museums, scientists, and historical societies supported the legislation.88 NAG-
PRA was a compromise that was passed in the Senate by voice vote and by unan-
imous consent in the House of Representatives.89 Morris A. Fred describes the
compromise as follows:90
For the Native Americans, NAGPRA presented an opportunity to re-
dress the wrongs of past centuries perpetrated by the dominant culture
and to regain control over the past so as to build a future. For the mu-
seums, the challenge to their past practices in building collections also
implicated their future, for it would not only affect their research and
exhibitions (i.e., which objects were to remain in their collections) but
also their methods for continuing to collect data to develop further their
scientific fields.
NAGPRA is also an exceptional human rights law in that it goes far beyond the
usually limited scope of action of human rights standards. It is a federal act that
explicitly accomplishes human rights with positive, concrete duties imposed upon
federal agencies and museums. In addition, it provides for important tools to sup-
port the enforcement of the required activities. They include (1) the obligation of
federal agencies and museums to initiate repatriation processes by inventorying
and summarizing their collections in consultation with tribal governments, Na-
tive Hawaiian organizations’ officials, and traditional religious leaders;91 (2) the
obligation of federal agencies and museums to publish notices of completed in-
ventories92 and notices of intent to repatriate;93 (3) specific procedural structures
to support the processes such as the NAGPRA Review Committee formed by a
balanced number of native and nonnative members;94 (4) penalties against mu-
seums in case of noncompliance;95 and (5) financial grants to the amounts of
about USD 2 million per year96 for museums and tribes in order to enable them
to carry out NAGPRA activities.97
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Finally, NAGPRA is a special human rights law as it explicitly integrated Native
American laws and customs through direct consultations. It requires cooperation
with Native American tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations to determine cul-
tural affiliation, the right of possession, and the definition of whether an object is
sacred or cultural patrimony in the sense of NAGPRA.98 This integrative process
of Native Americans in decision making in a human rights framework is a central
value of the act. Thereby, NAGPRA does not make the mistake of simply referring
to Native American customary law which is—like Western law—basically unsuit-
able for bridging indigenous andWestern worldviews.99 It, rather, goes in line with
the proposal of Christoph B. Graber who has evaluated procedural solutions as
the most promising for dealing with indigenous peoples that are claiming control
over their cultural heritage.100 Participatory processes correspond much better with
the traditional individual rights system of Native American communities. Rather
than through abstract substantive rights, such as private property rights, Native
American individual rights unfold through procedural rights.101 As political power
was located with families, local villages, or bands,102 respect for individual auton-
omy in these structures was deployed through everyone’s right to speak and be
part of collective decision making.103
Assessment
NAGPRA provides an amendment to U.S. cultural property law reflecting human
rights and indigenous perspectives. It has confronted social and historical wrongs
and legally acknowledged ongoing lives, cultures, and beliefs of precolonial, indig-
enous groups, which are separate from and incompatible with Western large-scale
structures and majority interests. Thereby, the concept of cultural affiliation is more
than simply an evidentiary term in determining ownership in Native American
cultural property. It is more than a means to restore possession or control of ob-
jects that Native American tribes and Native Hawaiian groups have arguably never
relinquished, or lost into what property law calls full ownership. It is a concept
that, on the one hand, ultimately triggers indigenous peoples to reestablish shared
identity and new cultural values in a changed political, economic, and cultural
environment. On the other hand, it requires Western institutions to learn about
and possibly reshape cultural history by respecting indigenous values. With ex-
tended repatriation obligations of Western institutions, NAGPRA stipulates a lim-
ited shift of the power of decision onto Native American tribes. Yet, despite the
expected detrimental effects of such a shift, NAGPRA’s repatriation process, which
has lasted for more than 20 years, shows the contrary. Repatriations did not lead
to the emptying of collections, and Native American participation in the process
has had a highly stimulating effect on all parties involved.
TheUnited States GovernmentAccountability Office Report to Congressional Re-
questers of July 2010 (GAOReport) inspected theNAGPRAwork performed by eight
key federal agencies with substantial collections of Native American cultural prop-
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erty.104 The number of historical objects of these eight agencies ranged from 5.7mil-
lion to 122.5 million, or 589,796 cubic feet (10,701 m3) each.105 To date, however,
a mere 209,626 objects have been identified as culturally affiliated NAGPRA human
remains and associated funerary objects. Indeed, a little less than three-quarters of
them (141,027) have been repatriated.106 These numbers are substantial, but still
small in comparison with the millions of historical objects stored in the collections
of the eight GAOReport agencies alone.A large undisclosed number of NativeAmer-
ican objects remain in the collections, and there is no indication that the size of the
collections would not be able to cope with NAGPRA repatriations.107
The reason for the limited repatriation activities under NAGPRA is the reluc-
tance of Native American tribes to require the return of their objects. For exam-
ple, the Navajo Nation, the receiver of the Pectol Shields, does not generally require
repatriation of human remains. They foster the predominant belief that contact
with the dead may sicken or kill the contaminated person.108 The Hopi amended
their encompassing repatriation policy after having evaluated chemicals on the
returned objects as posing a health risk for their people. Such chemical products
were applied for the better preservation of the objects.109
More typical, however, is the experience of Wendy Teeter and Hidonee Spoon-
hunter, the curator and assistant curator of Archaeology of the UCLA Fowler Mu-
seum in Los Angeles. The Sealaska Corporation came to investigate the Fowler
Museum’s collection. This native corporation, owned by over 20,000 tribal mem-
ber shareholders from the Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian people,110 looked at 4000
objects of the museum with possible cultural affiliation. They came out with only
a few objects in which they were really interested and only one that they were
looking to pursue for repatriation. It was a Chilkat blanket, which they wanted for
ceremonial use.111 Wendy Teeter and Hidonee Spoonhunter never experienced un-
reasonable or unethical requests. It is thus not only spiritual beliefs, lack of cul-
tural reburial protocols, lack of burial sites, or lack of financial resources that hinder
a more extensive NAGPRA process.112 It is also a moderate reservation of the tribes
and organizations vis-à-vis repatriation or the lack of interest. This has been the
case over the last 20 years of NAGPRA, and it is not expected that this tendency is
going to drastically change in the future, at least on the domestic level.
Museums and agencies generally benefit from the NAGPRA process even more
than Native Americans. During the cultural affiliation process, the involved tribes
contribute masses of information and knowledge about the objects, their use, cul-
tural protocols, and history, thereby substantially enhancing their value.113 Many
long-stored cultural objects, thought to be worthless, gain new meaning in the
exchange between continuing cultures. The repatriation of human remains allows
reburials that at the same time serve to reestablish a better relationship with Na-
tive American tribes. The NAGPRA process uncovers poor curating practices, along
with poor historical records and documentation114 and challenges archaeologist
curators, museums, and agency personnel to the benefit of the collections. At the
same time, it puts responsibility on the Native Americans who are trying to re-
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connect the loose ends of their traditional lives through the evaluation of objects
and establish family bonds through the burial of lost relatives.115 NAGPRA in-
duces tribes to redevelop lost cultural protocols and ceremonies for the reburial of
human remains.116 They have to remember or reestablish cultural practices and
ceremonies, as only sacred objects “for the practice of traditional Native American
religions by their present day adherents” and cultural patrimony with “ongoing
historical, traditional, or cultural importance” may be repatriated.117 Bands also
have to re-form as distinct groups with their own separate identity, as only rec-
ognized tribes may claim repatriations.118 They have to negotiate with other tribes
to sort out competing repatriation requests, as NAGPRA states that in such cases
federal agencies and museums may keep the item until the requesting parties reach
agreement, or the dispute is otherwise resolved.119 And last but not least, NAG-
PRA encourages the development of tribal museums and cultural centers, the num-
ber of which has already surpassed 150 in the United States.120
In short, NAGPRA fostered new partnerships and cooperation between scien-
tists and Native Americans and “redefined the scope of a museum’s fiduciary du-
ties without draining collections.”121 The NAGPRA process challenges the involved
parties, but at the same time stimulates a new booming interest in American or
Native American cultural diversity. Allegedly, the upgrading of the Native Amer-
ican cultures even has a macroeconomic benefit. It would be worth evaluating
NAGPRA’s impact on cultural self-esteem, involvement in majority activities, knowl-
edge, health,122 and the development of economic independence of tribes and Na-
tive American families.123 In comparison, the financial investments for the NAGPRA
process are minimal. Federal agencies spend only a fraction of their budgets on
NAGPRA activities.124 Grants awarded to tribes and museums for repatriation
projects, on average, do not exceed USD 40,000–60,000 each (total around USD 2
million/year).125
This brings us back to the stewardship theory of Carpenter et al. summarized
above in section 2. NAGPRA is a working example of the stewardship theory that
proves that the implementation of stewardship duties into legal property struc-
tures is possible and helps to balance worldviews and notions of property. The
language used in NAGPRA notices of intent, for example, shows how such indig-
enous notions of stewardship may be integrated into cultural property law prin-
ciples. Federal agencies and museums have to publish such notices of intent in the
Federal Register before they actually repatriate culturally affiliated items.126 On
the one hand, the notices clearly define, in Western terminology, the “owners” of
the objects.127 On the other hand, the notices use stewardship terminology by stat-
ing for example that a certain cultural item was consecrated to a person “to care
for and use the items,” or to a person as the appropriate “custodian” of an item.
Despite such different wording, the intention is clear and defined by NAGPRA. In
its ultimate meaning, the stewardship theory does not support an absolute right
to repatriation, which would push its object into the trap of absolute rights al-
ready inherent in the concept of ownership and property. It does not support
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repatriation activities that prevent an object fulfilling its cultural purpose or wors-
ens the relation between the interest groups. Stewardship rather requires that the
culturally affiliated group of people, ready and able to fulfill and ensure steward-
ship duties, should be allowed to define the use and destiny of a cultural object
according to applicable or, if necessary, redeveloped cultural protocols.
Michael F. Brown has nevertheless heavily criticized the stewardship theory
mainly for not considering the shrinking public domain and its protection from
privatization, for being unrealistic, too vaguely defined, and unable to prevent
commodification.128 However, why should we not add the bundles of steward-
ship rights and duties of indigenous peoples to their cultural property, if this
helps to bridge language differences, comply with human rights, and even en-
hance the value of indigenous objects and lives for the benefit of everyone? Why
should we reinforce the illusion of the public domain, which stands at the dis-
cretion of the economically and militarily powerful if needed, above the valid
interests of the culturally affiliated? Why should cultural affiliation not be one of
the determining factors, and stewardship a guiding principle, in property law
and jurisprudence if a participation mechanism costs less than the micro- and
macroeconomic gain?
CULTURAL AFFILIATION FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Cultural Affiliation as a Standard for Implementing UNDRIP
At the international level, the issue of indigenous cultural property finds impor-
tant regulations in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 Sep-
tember 2007. As well as the 143 countries originally voting for the Declaration, the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—originally voting against it—
officially declared endorsement of it by the end of 2010.129 UNDRIP emerged from
the human rights bodies of the United Nations, mainly the former UN Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
and theWorking Group on Indigenous Populations, in a process lasting more than
two decades.130 The UNDRIP is in principle not legally binding. Yet UNDRIP had
a massive impact on academic and human rights activists’ fields as well as public
awareness. Important academic opinion also assessed customary international law
in UNDRIP. Even if generally contested, the International Law Association (ILA)131
Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for example, took the position
that the UNDRIP provisions referring to the right to cultural identity as well as
the right to adequate reparation and redress for suffered wrongs are internation-
ally binding customary law.132 In any case, however, for UNDRIP to become truly
effective, an implementation process at regional, national, and international level
would have to follow.
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In the field of indigenous cultural property—specifically cultural tangible and
movable objects—UNDRIP gives distinct indications of the measures to be taken.
It contains a clear statement that indigenous human remains have to be repatri-
ated (Article 12). Furthermore, it requires access and/or repatriation of ceremo-
nial objects (Article 12.2) and restitution of artefacts (Article 11.2), if they were
taken without the indigenous peoples’ free, prior, and informed consent or in vi-
olation of the relevant indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, and customs. These
provisions go beyond private property concepts, as principally they neither re-
quire prior ownership nor any kind of title in the objects for indigenous peoples
to access or claim for restitution of “their” objects. The reference to “their”—
meaning the indigenous peoples’ cultural property—leaves open what allocation
concept shall apply. Just because the text refers to “their” property, this does not
mean that it talks about private ownership. Especially in the context of indigenous
peoples, the chances are high that a right to use or a right to custody prevails over
a right of ownership.133 In addition, the provisions do not help in assessing the
particular beneficiaries, or the laws, traditions, and customs to be applied.
That is where NAGPRA’s cultural affiliation concept could step in and make
UNDRIP’s cultural property provisions practicable and enforceable in any other
state. It would allow appropriate solutions along cultural lines with the avoidance
of narrow property thinking. However, when looking at NAGPRA and its cultural
affiliation concept, one must also acknowledge the factors that helped the act to
succeed and the clear lines and limits that the United States legislators drew in
order for the act to be passed.
Factors to Be Considered When Implementing Cultural
Affiliation
The cultural affiliation concept in NAGPRA helped to initiate and carry out a
certain redistribution process of Native American cultural property in the United
States. This is politically challenging, as redistribution processes may cause legal
insecurity or—especially in case of land redistributions—even political destabi-
lization.134 In the case of NAGPRA, however, the act forms part of federal stat-
utory law enjoying federal enforcement leverage existing under the rule of law.
As such, it left no space for legal insecurity to arise. Furthermore, NAGPRA’s
redistribution process is limited to old and newly excavated tangible, movable
Native American cultural property. With regard to sacred Native American ob-
jects, NAGPRA narrows the subject matter even further by requesting present-
day ceremonial use.135 The same is true for cultural patrimony, which must be
of ongoing, central importance to Native American tribes in order to fall under
NAGPRA.136 The redistribution process is thus far from having a politically de-
stabilizing effect. Nevertheless, many defining and limiting factors and circum-
stances were necessary for NAGPRA to be passed and to succeed. They equally
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need to be considered when looking at the cultural affiliation concept as an im-
plementation standard for the UNDRIP provisions.
A first important factor that needs to be considered is that in the United States
a special legal and political relationship between the federal government and the
Native American tribes could be established. This relationship is rooted in a Su-
preme Court decision of 1831, in which Chief Justice Marshall described the re-
lationship between the federal government and the Native American tribes as that
of a “ward to his guardian” with the Native Americans as “domestic dependent
nations.”137 This statement developed into a trust doctrine and later into a system
of federal Indian law (of which NAGPRA forms part). Furthermore, the special
relationship between the federal government and Native Americans also stands in
a tradition of preferential treatment and affirmative action on behalf of Native
Americans and Native American tribes138 even against possible equal rights con-
cerns.139 The special relationship thus legitimized the federal government to treat
Native American repatriation claims in particular and to advocate redistribution
of Native American property on their behalf. In every other country where indig-
enous peoples do not enjoy a similar position within the state’s structure, the en-
forcement of a legal redistribution of cultural property might cause more political
difficulties.
Furthermore, in view of the historic conflict between state governments and
indigenous peoples, a legal federal act such as NAGPRA may not be appropriate
to implement human rights standards. Indigenous peoples might principally ob-
ject to the subjugation of their affairs under state law and to definitions that form
part of Western tradition.140 NAGPRA exemplifies, however, that state law, if drafted
carefully, is able to successfully bridge underlying conflicts.141
When looking at NAGPRA for ways to implement UNDRIP’s cultural property
standards, one must also not forget that NAGPRA did not have to resolve ab initio
the usually very difficult question of who should be the beneficiaries of the redis-
tribution. The act could rely on previous common and statutory federal law that
contain definitions and recognition procedures for Native Americans and Native
American tribes.142 It furthermore profited from a well-developed integration of
Native American tribal realities into United States law as the result of a long-
ranging social, political, and legal process. Thereby, NAGPRA and especially its
cultural affiliation concept benefit substantially from the large amount of work
invested in refurbishing U.S. colonial history. The important cultural knowledge
and common understanding gained from that process substantially helps the NAG-
PRA process to work in practice. And last but not least, of great importance for
NAGPRA’s success is the fact that the government runs and financially supports
the process. NAGPRA is thus structurally and politically well embedded, and works
due to the availability of the necessary know-how and resources. All these factors
need to be adequately taken into account when looking at NAGPRA and its cul-
tural affiliation as an example for the implementation of UNDRIP’s cultural prop-
erty provisions in other countries.
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Limitations to Be Considered When Implementing Cultural
Affiliation
The Exclusion of Private Parties
Probably the most important limitation in NAGPRA that helped the act to be
passed is its narrow definition of the affected addressees. Only U.S. federal agen-
cies and federally funded museums have to follow NAGPRA’s repatriation obliga-
tions.143 In this sense NAGPRA explicitly states that the “Act reflects the unique
relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes and Native Ha-
waiian organizations and should not be construed to establish a precedent with
respect to any other individual, organization or foreign government.”144
NAGPRA thus remains without obvious effect on private entities (other than
the Native American beneficiaries) that do not receive federal funds. Thereby, it
circumvents the most difficult problem of any redistribution process, which is the
possible infringement of the right to private property. In the United States, this
right to private property is enacted in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.145 Worldwide, this right is the most frequently codified constitutional right146
and an important international human rights standard. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights147 explicitly guarantees the right to individual property in
Article 17. Also, the three regional human rights standards protect the right to
private property: the American Convention on Human Rights148 in Article 21, the
African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights149 in Article 14, and the
European Convention on Human Rights150 in Article 1 of Protocol 1.151
NAGPRA nevertheless has two sections that directly affect the individual prop-
erty of third parties. This is the case in the section about NAGPRA items newly
excavated or discovered on federal or tribal lands after 16 November 1990.152 For
such objects, NAGPRA—by law—imposes “native ownership”153 upon the Native
Americans.154 As a consequence, it entitles the so-defined Native American own-
ers to civil property claims against any individual finder or future possessor of
such objects, irrespective of private property finder’s law. NAGPRA itself and the
cultural affiliation prong are decisive.155
The other NAGPRA section that goes beyond the federal and Native American
relationship is 18 U.S.C. § 1170. This section penalizes illegal trafficking in Native
American objects. It includes the knowing sale, purchase, use for profit, or trans-
portation for sale or profit of human remains156 and cultural items.157 With re-
gard to human remains, the clause is not limited to any particular age of human
remains, or to objects previously interred in federal or tribal lands.158 Thus, any-
body claiming or paying money for any Native American human remains within
or outside the United States territory runs the risk of committing a NAGPRA crime.
The effect is that human remains of Native Americans effectively have become res
extra commercium. With regard to cultural items, trafficking is penalized if they
were obtained in violation of NAGPRA’s ownership or permit provisions159 or in
violation of NAGPRA’s repatriation provisions (by removing an object from the
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repatriation process for example).160 In both instances, a criminal conviction can
be avoided if the offender proves a right of possession to the object that is, how-
ever, subject to the voluntary consent of the Native American individual or group
with authority to alienate the object.161 This application of NAGPRA on private
persons has been challenged in court. However, in U.S. v Kramer,162 the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit confirmed the applicability to individuals as follows:163
It is true that Congress enacted NAGPRA to protect Native American
human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural
patrimony, and to repatriate such objects currently held or controlled
by federal agencies and museums.. . . However, “to give teeth to this stat-
utory mission,” section 4 of NAGPRA amended Title 18 of the United
States Code to criminalize trafficking in Native American human re-
mains and cultural items, in an effort to eliminate the profit incentive
perceived to be a motivating force behind the plundering of such items. . . .
It is clear that the criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1170(b), to which de-
fendant pleaded guilty, encompasses violations by individual traders such
as Kramer.
Apart from such specific effects of NAGPRA on Native American cultural prop-
erty in possession of private persons, NAGPRA leaves most cases with regard to
Native American cultural property outside the possession of federal agencies and
museums unresolved. UNDRIP’s provisions, however, principally require more en-
compassing solutions.
The Exclusion of International Claims
NAGPRA also limits its field of application to domestic issues. It does not con-
sider international claims of Native Americans for their cultural property. As stated
above, NAGPRA explicitly provides that it should not be construed to establish a
precedent with respect to foreign governments.164 Thus, the act avoids extraterri-
torial effect and any conflict with Native American cultural property state posses-
sions outside the United States. This is in line with the international principle that
states respect each other’s territoriality and the property rights attached thereto.
The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States of 1949165 formulated such
territorial property rights by ensuring the right of every state to “exercise jurisdic-
tion over its territory and over all persons and things therein” (Article 2). This is
deployed in the genuine universal juridical freedom of states to use and exploit
their territories whenever they consider it desirable for their progress and eco-
nomic development.166
However, NAGPRA could have at least empowered and obliged the federal gov-
ernment to work at the international level toward solutions for Native American
repatriation claims. One may even raise the question as to whether the fiduciary
duty of the federal government vis-à-vis the Native American tribes, which ema-
nates from their special relationship, would not require such activity from the fed-
eral government even without an explicit legal provision.
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CONCLUSION
Private property law as originally developed in Roman law may not provide ade-
quate solutions for indigenous peoples’ cultural property claims. The latest inter-
national regulations, most importantly UNDRIP, require going beyond property
thinking to better respect the interests of indigenous peoples to control or access
their cultural property.
NAGPRA is a pioneer in implementing such requests for tangible, movable Na-
tive American cultural property, in the relationship between the United States fed-
eral government and Native American tribes. It innovated the concept of cultural
affiliation, which turned out to be a successful instrument, stimulating a vibrant
exchange between scientists, museums and tribes, adding value to many collec-
tions and objects. NAGPRA’s cultural affiliation concept is a working example from
which cultural property lawyers can learn that the property law principle of look-
ing into the act of acquisition is not the only just solution for allocating cultural
property. The cultural affiliation prong bridges different property concepts that
are based on very different worldviews and it better complies with human rights
standards thanWestern private property law principles. It serves as an example for
countries that are ready to implement UNDRIP’s provisions on tangible, movable
cultural property of indigenous peoples. However, when implementing NAG-
PRA’s cultural affiliation concept, one not only has to consider the political and
legal factors that helped NAGPRA to be passed and to succeed, it is also important
to acknowledge the limits to the cultural affiliation concept in NAGPRA, even if
they do not comply with the provisions of UNDRIP.
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12. Humphrey andVerdery, “Introduction: Raising Questions about Property,” 4, citing Lewis Henry
Morgan.
13. De Laveleye, Primitive Property.
14. Humphrey and Verdery, “Introduction: Raising Questions about Property,” 4.
15. This categorization stems from UNDRIP Articles 11 and 12 and 20 U.S.C. § 3001(3) of the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).
16. UNDRIP, GA Res. 61/295 (UN Doc. A/61/L.67 and Add.1) (adopted on 13 September 2007).
17. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013, 18 U.S.C. § 1170.
18. Kaser and Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht, 119, 124; and Noyes, The Institution of Property, 78–79.
19. Kaser and Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht, 120.
20. Blackstone, “Commentaries on the Laws of England,” 393.
21. Kaser and Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht, 129.
22. Kaser and Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht, 144–145.
23. Kaser and Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht, 145.
24. Kaser and Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht, 104–105.
25. Cour de cassation 17 June 1896 (Jean Bonnin c. Villes de Mâcon et de Lyon), cited by Siehr,
“International Art Trade and the Law,” 64.
26. Italian Civil Code, Article 822(2); see Siehr, “International Art Trade and the Law,” 65.
27. For an overview on such cantonal law, see Weber, Unveräusserliches Kulturgut, 20–23.
28. Regarding clerical rules of res sacra, see Weidner, Kulturgüter als res extra commercium, 21–24;
and Weber, Unveräusserliches Kulturgut, 198–214.
29. Weidner, Kulturgüter als res extra commercium, 95–96.
30. On such instruments, see Siehr, “International Art Trade and the Law,” 132–146 and 162–232;
most important is the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 823 UNTS 231 (adopted on 14
November 1970, entered into force 24 April 1972).
31. See, for example, The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict of 1954 (adopted on 14 May 1954, entered into force 7 August 1956); and The
Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954,
specifically Article I(3) of the Protocol.
32. On an international level the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects, 34 ILM 1322 (adopted on 24 June 1995, entered into force 1 July 1998) concen-
trates on “stolen” objects in one of two main sections. In the United States, courts have started
to qualify cultural property that has been transferred in violation of legal ownership clauses on
behalf of foreign states as being “stolen” according to the National Stolen Property Act on illicitly
exported archaeological cultural property. United States v Hollinshead (1974) 495 F 2d 1154 (9th
Cir); United States v McClain (1977) 545 F 2d 988 (5th Cir), (1979) 593 F 2d 658 (5th Cir);
United States v Pre-Columbian Artifacts and the Republic of Guatemala (1993) 845 F Supp 544 (ND
Ill); United States v Schultz (2002) 178 F Supp 2d 445 (SDNY), (2003) 333 F 3d 393 (2d Cir),
(2004) 157 L Ed 2d 891 (cert. denied). See generally Siehr, “International Art Trade and the Law,”
56–107.
33. Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1032.
34. Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1039–1046, referring to the opinions of
Eric A. Posner, Michael F. Brown, Naomi Mezey and Kwame Anthony Appiah.
35. Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property.”
36. The authors argue that the ultimate aim of legal protections should be to further Margaret J.
Radin’s concept of “human flourishing” by linking property and personhood as an alternative or
complement to wealth-maximization rhetoric. Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Prop-
erty,” 1046–1047, referring to Radin, Reinterpreting Property; Radin, Contested Commodities; and sev-
eral of her articles.
37. With regard to indigenous peoples’ cultural property the authors make a distinction between
property which may be used for development and trade (dynamic stewardship), and property that
54 KAROLINA KUPRECHT
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0940739112000057
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 14:33:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
needs to be kept away from the market in order to ensure proper use of cultural objects (static
stewardship); Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1083–1087.
38. Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1027–1028.
39. Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1028, 1050–1065. “It is for the contin-
uance of the tribe, its norms, values, and way of life, that Indian people bring their claims for on-
going access to sacred sites or other cultural resources—and not solely for their personal fulfilment.”
Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1051.
40. Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1065–1067. The primary goal in in-
digenous worldviews is the avoidance of disturbing spirits in animate things, rather than making
maximum possible use of them for their material benefit; See also Champagne, “Indigenous Self-
government, Cultural Heritage.”
41. Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1074.
42. 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(c).
43. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(2); 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1), 10.2.(e) and 10.14.
44. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1) and (2); and 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(1) and (2).
45. Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1048.
46. Humphrey and Verdery, “Introduction: Raising Questions about Property,” 17.
47. 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(e).
48. 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(f). See also Gunn,“The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act,” 528, referring to United States Senate, Providing for the Protection of Native American Graves, 10.
49. Threedy, “Claiming the Shields,” 100–101.
50. Threedy, “Claiming the Shields,” 110.
51. Nafziger, “Protection and Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage,” 73; Email from Neal
Busk, Head of the E.P. and Dorothy Hickman Pectol Family Organization. “Pectol Shields,” (6 March
2012), on file with the author.
52. Gunn, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” 528.
53. From the view of biological anthropologists, for example, NAGPRA’s cultural affiliation con-
cept compromises their role in determining cultural affiliation and ignores the complex cultural,
biological and historical processes associated with the development or construction of cultural iden-
tity. Schillaci and Bustard, “Controversy and Conflict.” On the concept’s application and difficulties
in practice see the National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, Federal Agency Im-
plementation of NAGPRA, 18, 41. On weaknesses of the United States’ statutory effort to protect and
repatriate indigenous heritage in general see Nafziger, “Protection and Repatriation of Indigenous
Cultural Heritage,” 73–75.
54. Schillaci and Bustard counted five Review Committee findings on cultural affiliation disputes
published in the Federal Register until 2010. Schillaci and Bustard, “Controversy and Conflict,” 357.
55. Bonnichsen v United States (2004) 367 F 3d (9th Cir), 879. See, for the decision of the District
Court of Oregon (2002), 217 F Supp 2d 1116, 1152–55 (D Or).
56. Bonnichsen v United States (2004), 881–882, 879.
57. For a summary of the courts’ holdings and a critical discussion of the case, see Nafziger, “Pro-
tection and Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage,” 62–70; and Harding, “Bonnichsen v. United
States.”
58. 43 C.F.R. § 10.11.
59. Goldberg, “A United States Perspective.” For a positive assessment of the 2010 NAGPRA Reg-
ulations, see Niesel, “Better Late Than Never?”
60. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3005.
61. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
62. Trope and Echo-Hawk, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” 44.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
64. Trope and Echo-Hawk, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” 44,
citing the Secretary of the Interior Federal Agencies Task Force, American Indian Religious Freedom
Act Report.
65. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c).
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66. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13).
67. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(5).
68. Trope, “Chapter 1,” 12.
69. See also 2 NAGPRA, 5 U.S.C. § 3002(a), by which NAGPRA attributes “ownership or control”
of Native American cultural items that are excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands after 16
November 1990 to the Native Americans.
70. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a).
71. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1).
72. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1)(A).
73. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1)(B) and (C). McKeown and Hutt, “In the Smaller Scope of
Conscience,” 187–188.
74. Nafziger, “Protection and Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage,” 47.
75. Nafziger and Dobkins, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in Its
First Decade,” 38.
76. See for example Nafziger and Dobkins, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act in Its First Decade,” 38–43; Gunn, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act,” 508–511.
77. Trope, “Chapter 1,” 45–47.
78. Nafziger, “Protection and Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage,” 42–44.
79. Nafziger, “Protection and Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage,” 43.
80. 20 U.S.C. § 80q.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 80a–1(a).
82. Nafziger, “Protection and Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage,” 42–45. Nafziger and
Dobkins, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in Its First Decade,” 79–81.
83. For international protection, see the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195 (adopted on 21 December 1965, entered into force
4 January 1969); and UN, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 and
1057 UNTS 407; 6 ILM 368 (adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976),
Articles 2 (1) and 26.
84. Trope and Echo-Hawk, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” 46–50.
85. Trope and Echo-Hawk, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” 59,
citing Senator Daniel Inouye.
86. Prohibition of Discrimination, see the UN International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195 (adopted on 21 December 1965, entered into
force 4 January 1969); Prohibition of Genocide, see UN Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277 (adopted on 9 December 1948, entered into force 12
January 1951); Right of Thought, Conscience, and Religion and Minority Protection, see Articles 18
and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407; 6 ILM 368 (adopted on 16 December
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). For the discussion of these rights in the realm of indig-
enous peoples’ repatriation requests, see Lenzerini, “The Trail of Broken Dreams.”
87. No other country has responded, to date, to indigenous peoples’ human rights claims for
control over their old cultural property in a similarly encompassing legal, statutory act. Activities
have accrued in other states, like Canada, with a variety of programs and policy initiatives, yet they
lack legal effect and are based upon ethical considerations or potential obligations. Bell, “Ownership
and Trade.”
88. McKeown and Hutt, “In the Smaller Scope of Conscience,” 187–188. Among the supporters
were the American Association of Museums, Society for American Archaeology, Society of Profes-
sional Archaeologists, Archaeological Institute of America, American Anthropological Association,
American Association of Physical Anthropologists, National Conference of State Historic Preserva-
tion Officers, National Trust for Historic Preservation, Preservation Action, Association on Ameri-
can Indian Affairs, Native American Rights Fund, and National Congress of American Indians.
89. McKeown and Hutt, “In the Smaller Scope of Conscience,” 153.
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90. Fred, “Law and Identity,” 203.
91. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3003 and 3004
92. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3003(d).
93. 43 C.F.R. § 10.8(f).
94. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3006.
95. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3007.
96. U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 14.
97. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3008. No funding is granted for repatriations from Federal agencies,
and no enforcement mechanism exists to ensure Federal agencies’ compliance except through liti-
gation by private parties. U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 51, 53.
98. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (4C and 4D).
99. Graber, “Institutionalization of Creativity,” 250–251.
100. Graber, “Institutionalization of Creativity,” 251–252.
101. Goldberg, “Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization,” 913.
102. Champagne, Notes from the Center of Turtle Island, 7.
103. Goldberg, “Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization,” 912.
104. Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Park Service (NPS), U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture’s Forest Service, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), and the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA). U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 51, 53.
105. U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 7.
106. U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 45.
107. The activities vary from agency to agency. Some have already published thousands of notices
of inventory completion and several notices of intent to repatriate cultural items. Others, such as the
TVA, have not yet established cultural affiliations for any of their NAGPRA items. U.S. GAO, Report
to Congressional Requesters, 21, 46, 53.
108. Holiday and McPherson, A Navajo Legacy, 235–239.
109. Loma’Omvaya, “NAGPRA Artefact Repatriation.”
110. See http://www.sealaska.com/page/about_us.html.
111. Teeter and Spoonhunter. Interview with author, 16 March 2011.
112. Teeter and Spoonhunter. Interview.
113. Teeter and Spoonhunter. Interview.
114. U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 17, 29.
115. Teeter and Spoonhunter. Interview.
116. U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 49.
117. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C and D).
118. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(7).
119. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3005(e). U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 49. In the Pec-
tol Shields case, not only the Navajo Nation, but also Ute and Paiute tribes and the Southern Ute
tribes presented cultural affiliation evidence. Threedy, “Claiming the Shields,” 115.
120. Gunn, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” 522.
121. Nafziger, “Protection and Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage,” 71.
122. On the Native American health problematic in general see Harvard Project on American
Indian Economic Development, State of the Native Nations, 219–225. President Obama referred to
Native American health problems in his speech relating to the United States’ endorsement of UN-
DRIP in December 2010: “We know that Native Americans die of illnesses like diabetes, pneumonia,
flu—even tuberculosis—at far higher rates than the rest of the population,” http://www.reuters.com/
article/2010/12/16/us-obama-tribes-idUSTRE6BF4QJ20101216.
123. On the relationship between a flourishing cultural sector aZnd the socioeconomic develop-
ment of the Ma¯ori peoples, see Lai, “Ma¯ori Culture in the Modern World,” 14–17.
124. The Bureau of Land Management, for example, with an agency budget of USD 1.3 billion in
the 2010 fiscal year, reported a budget of USD 15.7 million for cultural resources for 2009. Only USD
69,286 was expended for NAGPRA compliance. U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 20.
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125. U.S. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, 88–89.
126. 43 C.F.R. §10.8(f).
127. See the notice of intent published on 24 May 1996. The National Park Service announced in
this notice the repatriation of 19 sacred Navajo objects from the Hubbell Trading Post National
Historic Site to a lineal descendant of Ramon Hubbell. Federal Register, 24 May 1996, 61 (102), 26,
206. See also the notice of intent published on 14 July 1997. The Laboratory of Anthropology of the
Museum of Indian Arts and Culture in Santa Fe announced in this notice the repatriation of a Chir-
icahua Apache Gahe mask of painted wood to the Mescalero Apache tribe. Federal Register, 14 July
1997, 62 (134), 37, 592.
128. Brown, “Culture, Property, and Peoplehood.” For defending responses, see Carpenter, Katyal,
and Riley, “Clarifying Cultural Property”; Tsosie, “International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage.”
129. UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Online News, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/
unpfii/en/news.html.
130. See, for example, Daes, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” 11–37.
131. The ILA was founded in Brussels in 1873. Its objectives under its Constitution are “the study,
clarification and development of international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of
international understanding and respect for international law.” The ILA has consultative status, as an
international nongovernmental organization, with a number of United Nations specialized agencies.
See http://www.ila-hq.org.
132. ILA Committee of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,Draft Interim Report, 43–52. For critical
appraisal, see Kuprecht, “Human Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation,” 220–
222; Lai, “The Protection of Ma¯ori Cultural Heritage,” 19–23.
133. Humphrey and Verdery, “Introduction: Raising Questions about Property,” 12.
134. According to Daniel Fitzpatrick, in fragile states, restitution or redistribution programs do
not work and are even detrimental. This is, however, particularly the case when land rights are af-
fected. Fitzpatrick, “Possession, Custom and Social Order.”
135. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3).
136. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3).
137. Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia (1831) 30 U.S. 1 (Pet.), 17.
138. Goldberg, “American Indians and Preferential Treatment,” 943–955.
139. Goldberg, “American Indians and Preferential Treatment,” 950–955.
140. Coombe, “The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity,” 275.
141. See also Humphrey and Verdery, “Introduction: Raising Questions about Property,” 13–14.
142. Goldberg, “A United States Perspective.”
143. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(4 and 8).
144. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3010.
145. The Fifth Amendment protects private property from being taken for public use without
just compensation. The Constitution of the United States, Amendment 5 (passed 25 September 1791,
ratified 15 December 1971). For possible Fifth Amendment implications of NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. §
3002 in cases of inadvertent discovery of NAGPRA on reservation fee lands, see Johnson and Haen-
sly, “Fifth Amendment Takings Implications of NAGPRA.”
146. This was the outcome of a compilation of observations and proposals and a catalogue of the
relevant provisions in national constitutions used by the Economic and Social Council to draft the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (van Banning, Human Right to Property, 137).
147. UN GA Res. 217A (III) (UN Doc. A/810) (adopted on 10 December 1948).
148. OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123 (adopted on 22 November 1969, entered into
force 18 July 1978); reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American
System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992).
149. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 21 ILM 58 (adopted on 27 June 1981, entered into force 21
October 1986).
150. CETS No. 005 (adopted on 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953).
151. CETS No. 009 (adopted on 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 May 1954). For details, see
van Banning, Human Right to Property, 57–79.
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152. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
153. See Anton, Rechtshandbuch Kulturgüterschutz und Kunstrestitutionsrecht. The author com-
pares native ownership to in lege state ownership in cultural property.
154. See section 3.2, “NAGPRA and Property Law.”
155. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a). See section 3.2, “NAGPRA and Property Law.”
156. NAGPRA, 18 U.S.C. § 1170(a).
157. NAGPRA, 18 U.S.C. § 1170(b).
158. McKeown and Hutt, “In the Smaller Scope of Conscience,” 207; and Iraola, “A Primer on the
Criminal Penalty Provisions,” 435.
159. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
160. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3005. McKeown and Hutt, “In the Smaller Scope of Conscience,” 208;
and Iraola, “A Primer on the Criminal Penalty Provisions,” 435–437.
161. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3). Iraola, “A Primer on the Criminal Penalty Provisions,” 436;
Trope and Echo-Hawk, “The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” 73.
162. U.S. v Kramer (1999) 168 F 3d 1196 (C.A.10, N.M.).
163. U.S. v Kramer (1999) 168 F 3d 1196 (C.A.10, N.M.), 1201–1202.
164. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3010; see supra section 4.3.1, “The Exclusion of Private Parties.”
165. Submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s general report, Annex to
General Assembly Res. 375 (IV) (6 December 1949).
166. General Assembly Res. 545 (VI) (5 February 1952); Res. 626 (VII) (21 December 1952); Res.
1314 (XIII) (12 December 1958); Res. 1515 (XV) (15 December 1960); Res. 1803 (XVII) (14 De-
cember 1962); and Res. 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 1974).
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